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Current law makes it difficult, sometimes impossible, for most
federal taxpayers to deduct the cost of borrowing for education.1
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,2 individual taxpayers could
deduct interest expenses against ordinary income when the interest
was paid. This rule resulted in a satisfactory matching of the inter-
est cost of borrowing for education with the return on that invest-
ment.3 Currently, however, § 163(h) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 allows only those taxpayers who secure education loans
with their homes to deduct the interest payments.4 Those'who can
use their homes as collateral receive a federal subsidy of their edu-
cation expenses while non-homeowners do not. As this comment
will show, the present tax treatment of education interest expenses
is inconsistent both with sound normative principles of taxation
and with the legislative aims underlying the 1986 Code.
More particulary, insofar as a portion of education expenses
represents an investment in human capital rather than a pure
purchase of cultural enrichment, those investment expenses should
be amortized over the working life of the taxpayer and should pro-
vide the taxpayer deductions for the recovery of capital. Applying
this normative principle to all education expenses would be an im-
practical policy, for it would both create overwhelming administra-
tive problems and substantially diminish tax revenues. However,
this comment will argue that the difficulty in extending deductions
t B.S. 1985, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1988, The University of Chicago.
Some education costs can be deducted as business expenses under Treasury Regula-
tion § 1.162-5. However, this regulation specifically disallows most education expenses be-
cause they "constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenses and, there-
fore, are not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses." Treas.Reg. § 1.162-
5(b)(1).
2 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.L.No. 99-514, - Stat. -- , codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq. (1986)("1986 Act").
3 Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 163(a), Pub.L.No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (1954).
1 Internal Revenue Code of 1986 § 163(h), 26 U.S.C. § 163(h) (1986). The Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1986, including amendments introduced by the Revenue Act of 1987, will be
referred to as the "1986 Code." All further citations are to specific sections of the Internal
Revenue Code ("I.R.C.").
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to various other education expenses should not preclude the de-
ductibility of interest on education loans.
Section I examines the current treatment of education interest
expenses under § 163(h), demonstrating that it fails to effectuate
the congressional intent behind the 1986 Act and does not achieve
tax neutrality in education investment decisions. In addition, sec-
tion I shows that § 163(h) generates a tax expenditure for home-
owners which is unjustifiably linked to the historical homeowner-
ship tax preference.5 Section II explains the normative principles
underlying personal income taxation. Normative analysis provides
a theoretical benchmark with which to analyze § 163(h) and shows
that education costs are properly divided into investment and con-
sumption portions, and that the former should be treated as a de-
ductible expense. Relying on this normative analysis, section III
proposes a legislative solution to correct the fundamental flaws of §
163(h) with respect to educational expenses. This Comment con-
cludes that education interest expenses should be available as a
deduction to all taxpayers.
I. CURRENT TREATMENT OF EDUCATIONAL INTEREST EXPENSES
UNDER § 163(H)
The central purpose of the 1986 Act was to reduce the influ-
ence of tax bias in taxpayers' economic decisions. To that end,
Congress eliminated the consumer or personal interest deduction
of § 163(a) of the 1954 Code. Interest expenses for education loans
fell within the parameters of § 163(a). With § 163(h), the 1986 Act
repealed § 163(a) and the personal interest deduction. As amended
by the Revenue Act of 1987, § 163(h) denies taxpayers any per-
sonal interest deduction, including education interest, unless the
interest is paid on a loan secured by the taxpayer's residence.'
5 This Comment will use the terms tax expenditure and tax preference synonymously.
In 1967, Professor Stanley Surrey introduced the expression "tax expenditures" to convey
the idea that governmental action through the tax laws may be a functional substitute for
direct expenditures. Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform 6-7 (1973). The primary
difference between tax expenditures and direct expenditures is that the former reduce re-
ceipts, while the latter must enter the budget as outlays thus involving distinct political
processes and considerations.
I Section 163(h) provides that "[i]n the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, no
deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for personal interest paid or accrued during
the taxable year." I.R.C. § 163(h)(1). Homeowners who pay interest on loans secured by
their homes are provided with exceptions to this general prohibition. See §§ 163(h)(2)-(5).
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A. Legislative Intent of § 163(h) and the 1986 Act
An outline of Congress' intent in reforming the tax laws pro-
vides a foundation for analysis of the operation and results of §
163(h). On October 22, 1986, the President signed the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. Reflecting years of political and academic debate, the
1986 Act restructured the American system of taxation. With re-
spect to the individual income tax, the 1986 Act's primarily sought
to reshape the tax law to encourage savings and investment rather
than consumption,7 a focus preserved in the Revenue Act of 1987.1
Many politicians, academics, and tax practitioners felt the Tax
Code of 1954, through its complex deductions and credits, en-
couraged taxpayers (1) to make investment and consumption deci-
sions according to their tax consequences rather than on the non-
tax economic merits of such decisions, and (2) to consume rather
than save or invest. The personal interest deduction allowed in §
163(a) of the 1954 Code reflects these problems: the deduction en-
couraged taxpayers to consume and to support their increased con-
sumption by assuming debt. Essentially, the 1954 Code supported
increased consumption through tax expenditures. 9
Congress perceived the policies embodied in the 1954 Code to
be hampering the nation's economy and reacted by repealing the
personal interest deduction found in § 163(a) and amending many
other provisions. These modifications were intended to reduce the
complexity, increase the fairness, and heighten the efficiency of the
federal income tax system. Although it is often difficult to deter-
mine whether a unified intent animated the legislative process, one
can safely assume that the central objective of the reform legisla-
tion was to reduce the perceived tax-bias affecting taxpayers' eco-
nomic decisions.10
The legislative history does not make clear why Congress al-
lowed homeowners to retain the deduction for personal interest on
' General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 74 Fed.Tax Rep. (CCH) No.19 at
9 (1987) ("The Blue Book"). Congress prepared The Blue Book after the passage of the
1986 Act in order to provide insight into the purposes of the Act. Although courts occasion-
ally have cited The Blue Book, it is purely intended as explanatory material and does not
have the same legal force as precedent or legislative history.
8 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, H.R.Rep.No. 100-391, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1031-34 (1987); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Conf.Rep.No. 100-495,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 916-17 (1987).
' See Allaire Urban Karzon, Tax Expenditures and Tax Reform, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 1397,
1399 (1985), for a more complete discussion on how tax expenditures influence taxpayer
behavior.
10 See The Blue Book at 6 (cited in note 7).
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loans secured by their homes in addition to the deduction for home
mortgage interest. Perhaps Congress wished to provide an added
incentive to encourage homeownership. A second explanation is
that homeowners, both through their own political power and
through the real estate and banking lobbies, exerted political pres-
sure for preferential treatment by Congress.11
The 1954 Code perceived education expenses as falling under
the personal interest category of § 163(a), although education ex-
penses arguably are more like savings or investment than con-
sumption. Like the 1954 Code, the 1986 Act did not recognize the
investment character of education expenses and eliminated the de-
duction for education loan interest along with other personal de-
ductions.12 The 1987 amendments to § 163(h) continued to assume
that education is a personal consumption item and, hence, that any
deduction granted for the interest expense of borrowing for educa-
tion is a tax expenditure.13
B. Current Operation of § 163(h)
Section 163(h) is a broad exclusionary provision which plainly
states that "[iun the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, no
deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for personal interest
paid or accrued during the taxable year."' 4 The section thereby
eliminates the deduction for interest-for example, credit card in-
" See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch:
Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 57, 111 (1987).
12 The 1986 Act also treated education and medical interest as personal interest but
gave both special status by allowing such loans up to the fair market value of the residence
securing them. I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(B) and (E) (1986). The 1986 Act has since been amended;
current law imposes a $100,000 limitation on the amount of deductible income.
" The 1987 amendments altered only the form of § 163(h) and a few minor particulars.
The Revenue Act of 1987 amended § 163(h) by placing all personal interest deductions in §
163(h)(3). Section 163(h)(4) was eliminated and § 163(h)(5) was redesignated as § 163(h)(4).
Section 163(h)(4) of the 1986 Act permitted borrowing for education if secured by a quali-
fied residence up to the fair market value of such residence, while the 1987 amendments
permit such borrowing only up to $100,000. On the surface, the 1987 rule appears to be more
restrictive. However, when one considers that $100,000 is a high allowance for the majority
of homeowning taxpayers and that the 1987 rule eliminates any restriction on the use of the
borrowed money, the new rule appears more permissive in its application to most homeown-
ing taxpayers.
14 I.R.C. § 163(h)(1). This provision creates a potential loophole for the taxpayer who
might consider incorporating to avoid losing the personal interest deduction. However, it is
unlikely that many taxpayers will initiate such a costly and sophisticated process simply to
retain this deduction. Most individuals tend to avoid the corporate form because of factors
unrelated to § 163(h): for example, potentially higher marginal tax rates, the possible loss of
other deductions such as the standard deduction for individual taxpayers, and the non-de-
ductibility of certain personal expenses even if the taxpayer does incorporate.
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terest-incurred in the course of personal consumption.
Congress provided an exception to this general rule, however,
for taxpayers who itemize15 and who borrow against homes they
own. Section 163(h), as amended in 1987, allows homeowners 16 to
borrow in the form of a home equity loan for any purpose, includ-
ing education, and then to deduct the subsequent interest pay-
ments when they are made. 17 Deductions for these payments are
allowed because they fit into one of the categories listed in §
163(h)(2), specifying forms of interest that are deductible because
they are not deemed "personal."'"
Section 163(h)(3) defines "qualified residence interest" as any
interest paid by the taxpayer "on indebtedness which is secured by
any property . . . which . . . is a qualified residence of the tax-
payer." Since § 163(h) applies only to loans secured with a "quali-
fied residence," a taxpayer who seeks to use that § to obtain a de-
duction for interest on an educational loan-typically a recourse
loan-could lose that residence if she defaults on the loan.
Section 163(h)(3), the deduction provision for homeowners,
consists of two parts: (1) "acquisition indebtedness", 9 and (2)
"home equity indebtedness, ' 20 both concepts introduced by the
11 I.R.C. § 63(d) states that "itemized deductions" include all deductions except: (1)
deductions allowed in arriving at adjusted gross income under § 62 (e.g., trade and business
deductions), and (2) deductions under § 151 for personal exemptions. Section 163(h) is
available only to itemizers.
"6 Homeowner is defined for purposes of this comment as a person who owns a "quali-
fied residence". "Qualified residence" is defined in amended § 163(h)(3)(A) to mean (1) the
taxpayer's principal residence within the meaning of § 1034 and (2) one other residence,
selected by the taxpayer, which is used as a residence as defined in § 280A(d)(1). Simply
put, the taxpayer can deduct the interest expense of loans secured by any two residences
owned by the taxpayer. A residence can be a house, a condominium, a co-op, a mobile home,
and possibly a boat.
17 Most individual taxpayers use the cash receipts and disbursements method of ac-
counting for tax purposes and hence interest deductions under § 163(h) would be deducted
in the year when actually paid to the lending institution.
'8 The five categories specified in § 163(h)(2) are:
(A) interest paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued in connection with
the conduct of a trade or business (other than the trade or business of performing
services as an employee),
B) any investment interest (within the meaning of subsection (d)),
C) any interest which is taken into account under § 469 in computing income or loss
from a passive activity of the taxpayer,
D) any qualified residence interest (within the meaning of paragraph (3)), and
E) any interest payable under § 6601 on any unpaid portion of the tax imposed by §
2001 for the period during which an extension of time for payment of such tax is in
effect under § 6163 or 6166.
19 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(i).
20 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(ii).
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1987 amendments. Acquisition indebtedness is defined in §
163(h)(3)(B) as any indebtedness which "is incurred in acquiring,
constructing, or substantially improving any qualified residence of
the taxpayer, and. . . is secured by such residence." '21 This restric-
tion is tempered by a high limitation of $1,000,000 of indebtedness
that can support deductible interest.22 No ceiling on acquisition in-
debtedness was present in § 163(h) of the 1986 Act.2 s
"Home equity indebtedness," the second new element intro-
duced by amended § 163(h)(3), is defined as "any indebtedness
(other than acquisition indebtedness) secured by a qualified resi-
dence".24 Home equity indebtedness can be used for any purpose,
including education, and home equity indebtedness is subject to
two limitations: (1) an overall limitation of $100,000,25 and (2) "the
fair market value of such qualified residence [securing such indebt-
edness], reduced by the amount of acquisition indebtedness with
respect to such residence. '26
Section 163(h) allows a taxpayer to deduct interest paid on
education loans secured by either a principal or secondary resi-
dence. The interest is deductible if the aggregate amount of the
principal borrowed does not exceed the difference between the
qualified residence's fair market value and acquisition indebted-
ness. If the amount of borrowing exceeds $100,000 then only a pro-
portionate amount of interest will be deductible in that taxable
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i).
See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii). Even though the $1,000,000 ceiling appear high, it is
notably the first attack on the homeowner interest deduction in the history of personal in-
come taxation in the United States.
23 For those taxpayers who secured education loans with their homes under § 163(h)(4)
of the 1986 Act, prior to October 13, 1987, such borrowing is acquisition indebtedness under
the amended Code. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(D)(i). Any such indebtedness lowers the $1,000,000
ceiling on acquisition indebtedness, I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(D)(ii), but the taxpayer may secure
additional education loans up to the $100,000 limit of home equity indebtedness without
losing any interest deductions.
24 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(c)(i).
2- I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). Again, the $100,000 limitation also applies to the sum of
qualified indebtedness borrowed by married taxpayers.
26 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i). Two examples demonstrate the interaction of the two statu-
tory restrictions. First, assume the taxpayer has $500,000 of acquisition indebtedness on a
residence with a current fair market value ("FMV") of $700,000. The taxpayer then borrows
$150,000 with a home equity loan. Under the first restriction, the taxpayer will be allowed to
deduct only the interest on the first $100,000 of home equity indebtedness or 2/3 of such
interest. Second, assume the taxpayer has $500,000 of acquisition indebtedness on a resi-
dence with a current FMV of $550,000. Further, assume the taxpayer has $75,000 of home
equity indebtedness (borrowed when the residence has a greater FMV). Here, the second
limitation operates to limit interest deductions to 2/3 of the interest paid on the $75,000.
These examples illustrate that deductions can fluctuate with the real estate market by oper-
ation of the tax code.
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year.27
Taxpayers who own homes and are willing to use them to se-
cure education loans thus receive a subsidy, in the form of a con-
gressional tax expenditure, in excess of that already present in the
home mortgage interest deduction which represents money truly
borrowed for the home. On the other hand, those taxpayers who do
not own their residences, whose residences do not contain enough
equity to secure education loans, whose residences already are
leveraged up to their fair market values, or who simply do not
want to risk their residence by using it as collateral for an educa-
tion loan will not receive a deduction for the amount of interest
paid. As will be shown in section II of this comment, this result is
an inequitable deviation from the principles of normative income
taxation structure.
C. Results of § 163(h)
1. Undesirable Economic Effects of § 163(h). Section 163(h)
alters the character of borrowing for education expenses. It affects
two primary economic considerations: (1) distribution of financial
liability on such borrowing, and (2) duty of repayment of the debt.
Since most students are not homeowners, any education loan that
is to fulfill the deductibility requirements of § 163(h) likely will be
secured by the parents' qualified residence. Unless the student-
child is made a co-owner of the residence,28 the parent must re-
main liable for repayment of the educational loan to retain the de-
duction. Even if the student also is made liable for the loan, the
parent's qualified residence will serve as security for the debt, and
the parents will bear the bulk of the risk of default. If the parent is
unable to make future interest payments and the student makes
them, the student will be barred from deducting such interest pay-
ments,2 9 while the borrower may have to include the amounts paid
in her taxable income.30
27 Section 163(h) contains no carryforward provision allowing a future deduction for
disallowed amounts of interest paid in the current taxable year. Thus, a taxpayer who does
not have enough income in the current taxable year to be able to utilize the deduction, or
whose interest payments exceed the limitations of § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii), loses the deduction
entirely. In contrast, there is a carryforward provision in § 163(d)(2) for investment interest.
" Wealthy parents may begin taking title to residences in the names of their children
with the foresight that appreciation in such residences will allow their children to avail
themselves of future interest deductions on education loans.
29 I.R.C. § 163(h)(1). See also I.R.C. § 267 (disallowing interest with respect to transac-
tions between related taxpayers).
30 Such inclusion appears remote. If the interest payment is below $10,000, it will qual-
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This result differs from the pre-1987 apportionment of liabil-
ity. Prior to the 1986 Code, the student-child could be singly liable
on any borrowing for education by using a guaranteed student loan
and, under § 163(a) of the 1954 Code, could deduct any interest
paid on such loans. With a guaranteed student loan, the govern-
ment secures the loan and promises to repay the lender in the
event the student defaults. This structure had no tax consequences
for the parent. Now, however, the parent and student must decide
whether the student should borrow without securing such borrow-
ing with a residence, thus losing the interest deduction, or whether
the parent should secure the loan with a residence and risk losing
that residence upon default. The decision is not simple because the
potential interest deduction can be substantial, yet the risk of los-
ing the residence is real.
The 1986 Code introduces a second economic consideration.
The Code structures the repayment of education loans so that the
interest deduction in § 163(h) is not completely lost. If the borrow-
ing parents repay the loan, they receive the deduction."1 However,
if the student is to repay the loan secured by her parents' home, a
complex series of transactions must be employed to enable her par-
ents to deduct the interest payment. In each repayment period, the
child must pay her parents the amount of interest and principal
due. This is viewed as a non-taxable gift from the child to her par-
ents under the 1986 Code. 2 The parent then pays the lending in-
stitution and takes a deduction under § 163(h) for the amount of
interest paid. The child receives no deduction even though her
funds were used to make the interest payment.
A student with sole liability for outstanding education loans
must employ another method so that her parents can obtain a de-
duction. Her parents must obtain a home equity loan and then re-
pay the child's outstanding education loans, which may be quite
substantial. If such lump sum repayment exceeds the gift tax ex-
emption,33 then a gift tax problem may arise. 4 Nevertheless, the
ify as a tax free gift under I.R.C. § 2503.
31 Under I.R.C. § 2503(e), the parent is allowed to pay unlimited tuition expenses di-
rectly to the eductional institution without any gift tax consequences. Other educational
expenses, such as books, room, and board, are in theory subject to the gift tax provisions.
See Treas.Reg. § 25.2503-6.
32 See I.R.C. § 7872. It is possible, though unlikely, that the I.R.S. would take the posi-
tion that this is a taxable gain to the parent since the child, in essence, is paying a debt-for
which the parent is liable. See Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxa-
tion, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 859, 874 (1982).
33 $20,000 in the case of married taxpayers filing a joint return. I.R.C. § 2502.
" Depending on the individual taxpayer, this also may give rise to a unified credit
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parents can deduct the home equity interest and the student can
make an annual tax-free gift to her parents to cover the loan pay-
ments. These transactions effectively allow the student to repay
the education loan while allowing her parents to take the deduc-
tion. The attractiveness of having the parents make annual pay-
ments with home equity borrowing is minimal because interest is
paid twice and produces only one deduction.
It will be much more difficult for the child to both repay the
education loan and receive the interest deduction, unless the child
owns an appreciated home. If her parents own such a home, they
can sell it to the child then lease it back. The child then can secure
a home equity loan, make a lump sum repayment of her education
loans, and then deduct her home equity interest payments. The
sale and lease arrangements could be structured to minimize or
eliminate all incidents of taxation.
Regardless of whether these transactions are successful, §
163(h)(3) introduces undesirable complexity into familial relations
and what should be relatively straightforward economic transac-
tions. This result frustrates the tax neutrality goals of the 1986
Act.
2. Discriminatory Effects of § 163(h). Another undesirable ef-
fect of § 163(h) is unfairness and discrimination against those indi-
viduals who borrow for education and do not own a home, or whose
homes do not meet the provisions of § 163(h). Congress has en-
dorsed a definition of "fairness" so that taxpayers with equal in-
comes who pursue the same economic activities ideally will pay
equal amounts of income tax.35 Contrary to this goal, § 163(h) pro-
duces a situation where two taxpayers with equivalent income in-
come levels likely will pay different amounts of tax. Assume one
taxpayer borrows for education securing the loan with her home
and a second taxpayer, with the same income as the first, obtains a
similar loan without using her home as security. The first taxpayer
will pay less tax than the second, because the first taxpayer is enti-
tled to the § 163(h) deduction.
Even given the congressional preference for home owning, this
inequity is unjustified because education has little to do with
homeownership and should not be linked with the homeownership
preference. Taxpayers who are unwilling or unable to use a home
equity loan to finance their education will be unable to deduct
their interest expense, even though education is primarily an in-
problem. See I.R.C. § 2505.
31 The Blue Book at 7-9 (cited in note 7).
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vestment in human capital, unlike consumption items such as
homeownership. Moreover, the many discussions of taxing the im-
puted rent derived by homeowners indicate that homeownership is
most accurately characterized as a consumption item. 6 Histori-
cally, homeowners have not been taxed on the imputed rent of
homeownership and have been able to deduct mortgage interest,
while renters have not received a corresponding deduction for their
monthly rent.
Linking a deduction for education loans to homeownership de-
nies educational opportunity to those at the economic margin of
society who are trying to invest in their human capital through
borrowing. As the cost of borrowing increases, individuals at the
margin may decide it is no longer cost efficient to forego current
earnings in order to pursue an education. The cost of borrowing
may rise marginally under § 163(h) for those non-homeowning bor-
rowers because homeowners will be encouraged to compete for
available funds for personal consumption, driving up the cost of
borrowing. This result further impedes the realization of educa-
tional goals for those individuals who are at the economic margin."7
A present value calculation of the costs of pursuing an educa-
tion illustrates this principle. The relevant equation is:
[PV(interest deduction) + PV(future earnings)] -
[PV(forgone earnings) + PV(tuition expense) + PV(interest
expense) + PV(miscellaneous educational expenses)]. 8
One can draw a number of conclusions from this equation. First, if
the left side of the equation exceeds the right, a rational taxpayer
would pursue education. Historically, the earnings of college gradu-
ates have far exceeded those of high school graduates;39 therefore,
most individuals, given the opportunity, will opt to pursue higher
education. However, as the costs of education continue to rise
faster than the earnings of college graduates, one approaches a
point where the economic returns of such an education no longer
exceeds the costs. At this point, the deductibility of education loan
interest expenses will become a decisive factor in whether an indi-
vidual will pursue higher education. This effect is exacerbated by
36 See id. at 263-64.
17 See C. Eugene Steuerle, Taxes, Loans, and Inflation: How the Nation's Wealth Be-
comes Misallocated (1985); Eugene Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage, Inflation, and the Taxation of
Interest Payments and Receipts, 30 Wayne L.Rev. 991 (1984).
8 PV = present value function.
39 See Department of Education, Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education
Statistics 1987 287 (1987)("Education Statistics").
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rising interest rates and by an increase in tax rate progression.
Most taxpayers undoubtedly rely on factors other than the de-
ductibility of education loan interest when deciding whether to at-
tend an institution of higher learning.40 However, one should not
underestimate the economic importance of the deduction for those
taxpayers who must borrow to pursue educational opportunities.
Those who can recover costs soon after graduation will pursue
higher education whether education loan interest is deductible or
not. However, as the costs of the education rise, so will the interest
expense, thereby extending the cost recovery period. Eventually,
this period will exceed that which the taxpayer is willing to endure
and she will forego borrowing for higher education. However, if the
interest is deductible, the cost recovery period is shortened-an ef-
fect of great significance to those taxpayers at the economic mar-gin. Furthermore, assuming borrowed funds are available, taxpay-
ers with external economic burdens, such as the responsibility to
support relatives, may be deterred if education loan interest is not
deductible. If such a burden is present, the deductibility of interest
would be crucial to any decision on whether to pursue higher
education.
Section 163(h) thus creates unwarranted complexity and tax
bias in taxpayers' economic and education decisions and discrimi-
nates between homeowners and non-homeowners. Ironically, these
results are the same ones which the 1986 Act sought to reform.4
This subsection has not questioned the validity of eliminating the
general personal interest deduction. The subsection does contend,
however, that Congress erred in effectively eliminating the educa-
tion loan interest deduction for only some taxpayers. With rising
education costs, a growing number of taxpayers must choose be-
tween borrowing for education or forgoing an investment in educa-
tion entirely.42 A crucial factor in this decision is the deductibility
of interest on such loans.43
40 Walter W. McMahon, Investment in Higher Education 2-3 (1974)(citing family in-
come as the major determinant).
41 The Blue Book at 6-11 (cited in note 7).
42 See Ray D. Madoff, Back to School After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Effect of the
New Law on Educational Funding, Taxes 570 (Sept. 1987); John R. Kramer, Will Legal
Education Remain Affordable, By Whom, and How?, 1987 Duke L.J. 240 (1987).
43 See McMahon, Investment in Higher Education at 24-25, 40-42, 60-68 (cited in note
40). McMahon states that the four most important factors in making this decision are cur-
rent income, expected returns, interest rates, and an index of desires for equity in educa-
tional opportunity. Id. at 4, 13-19.
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II. NORMATIVE TREATMENT OF EDUCATION EXPENSES
To fully diagnose the ills of § 163(h), one must turn to a base-
line normative analysis. Normative study facilitates an evaluation
of current tax treatment of certain items and provides direction for
tax policy. Congress has expressed a desire to adhere to normative
theory wherever possible in order to produce an accurate and equi-
table income tax system.44 Furthermore, in responding to the Pres-
ident's call for fundamental tax reform, the Treasury Department
relied exclusively on normative principles when it conceived Trea-
sury I, which provided a foundation for the 1986 Act.45
A. Haig-Simons Definition of Income
Normative income tax theory is based upon an economic defi-
nition of income in which income equals all consumption plus the
net change in wealth experienced between two points in time. Tax-
able income is the total amount of consumption and net change in
wealth, reduced by the cost of producing the income.46
A widely accepted economic definition of income is the Haig-
Simons concept of personal income. Robert Haig defined income as
"the money value of the net accretion to one's economic power be-
tween two points in time.' '47 Henry Simons refined Haig's defini-
tion as follows:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1)
the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2)
the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and the end of the period in question. In other
words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption
during the period to "wealth" at the end of the period and
then subtracting "wealth" at the beginning.48
'4 "The legislative history of the 1974 Act indicates that income is to be defined as
closely to economic income as measurement permits." John Karl Scholz, Tax Expenditures,
in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., Setting National Priorities: The 1984 Budget 243 (1983).
" Department of the Treasury, Tax Return for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic
Growth (1984). See Charles E. McLure, Jr. and George R. Zodrow, Treasury I and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986: The Economics and Politics of Tax Reform, 1 J.Econ.Persp. 37 (1987);
Joseph A. Pechman, Tax Reform: Theory and Practice, 1 J.Econ.Persp. 11, 15-17 (1987).
46 Justice Stewart recognized this principle in Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687,
691 (1966), stating that "[w]e start with the proposition that the federal income tax is a tax
on net income."
"I Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in Rob-
ert Murray Haig, ed., The Federal Income Tax 7 (1921)(emphasis omitted).
46 Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem
of Fiscal Policy 50 (1938). Simons paraphrased this refinement by stating that personal in-
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The Haig-Simons definition is broad and theoretical, including
items which in practice are excluded from the tax base because
they are intentional preferences or tax expenditures,49 or because
they involve administrative or structural distortions50 presenting
insurmountable obstacles to taxation.51 Although the general nor-
mative principles of federal income taxation are derived from the
Haig-Simons definition of income, Congress is not constrained to
follow any one theory of taxation, and in practice the federal in-
come tax system deviates from purely normative principles. In any
case, a normative analysis generates valuable insight into how a
purely theoretical or ideal system might work.
Under the Haig-Simons definition, net income forms the tax
base, and in determining taxable income, the costs of producing
income are deductible before the tax rate is applied.52 The follow-
ing subsection applies this principle to show that as an investment
in human capital, some portion of the costs of education are prop-
erly deductible against the income produced from an investment in
education.
B. Proper Treatment of Education Expenses Under the Haig-
Simons Definition of Income
Because education loan interest expenses are a subset of all
education expenses, a discussion of the normative treatment of ed-
ucation costs in general is in order. This subsection demonstrates
that certain costs of education are investments in human capital
which require amortization over the worklife of the taxpayer.
1. Amortization of Education Expenses. The Haig-Simons
come equals consumption plus accretion.
19 For a discussion of tax expenditures, see Analysis of Proposals Relating to Compre-
hensive Tax Reform, Comm.Prt.No. JCS-3-85, Joint Committee on Taxation, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 33-34 (1985).
"o This second deviation from the Haig-Simons definition will be referred to as "admin-
istrative distortions," a phrase suggested by Professor Daniel Shaviro of the University of
Chicago Law School.
" An example of the former is the tax-exempt status of municipal bonds, see I.R.C. §
103, while an example of the latter is the non-taxation of unrealized appreciation.
The latter example is, of course, a distorting principle that is fundamental to our notion
of taxation. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), where Justice Pitney reasoned
that taxpayers could not be taxed constitutionally under the sixteenth amendment on the
"mere appreciation in value" of capital assets; income had to be derived from invested capi-
tal. While experts now agree that the realization requirement is not a constitutionally com-
pelled, the requirement continues to be followed for administrative reasons which bar the
implementation of an ideal income tax system. See Paul B. Stephan, Federal Income Taxa-
tion and Human Capital, 70 Va.L.Rev. 1357, 1360 n.3 (1984).
52 See Henry C. Simons, Federal Tax Reform (1950).
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model allows deduction of both immediate investment costs and
investment costs which require amortization over the asset's useful
life.53 Under the tax laws, the primary test of whether an item is a
deductible capital expenditure or a non-deductible personal ex-
pense turns on whether the item has a basis that can be offset
against future income, either in computing gain upon disposition
or as an immediate deduction. Basis generally represents a tax-
payer's cost in acquiring an asset and is subject to adjustments for
depreciation. 4 A portion of an individual's education is an invest-
ment in human capital which provides such a basis.55 Justice Car-
dozo generalized that "[r]eputation and learning are akin to capital
assets, like the goodwill of an old partnership. For many, they are
the only tools with which to hew a pathway to success. The money
spent in acquiring them is well and wisely spent." 6
Justice Cardozo implied that such expenses require amortiza-
tion over the life of the capital asset, in this case the working life
of the taxpayer. The taxpayer taking such deductions is the stu-
dent who benefits from the education and who repays the educa-
tion loans. Proper normative treatment requires taxing foregone
earnings or imputed income "received" while the taxpayer is in
school and then amortizing the investment portion of the foregone
earnings and the education expenses over her future working life.57
Subsequent deductions then should be taken against the income
53 Amortization of capital costs is an established principle in taxation. See C.I.R. v.
Seaboard Finance Company, 367 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1966)(allowing amortization of amounts
in excess of purchase price found not to be goodwill); Selig v. United States, 565 F.Supp 524
(E.D.Wisc. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984)(allowing amortization of baseball player
contracts over players' five-year useful lives under § 167(a)); Treas.Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (al-
lowing depreciation of intangible items with reasonably ascertainable useful lives).
5, See I.R.C. § 1011 et seq.
"5 See Section II.B.2.
" Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-116 (1933) (citations omitted). But see Na-
thaniel A. Denman, 48 T.C. 2504, 2513 (1967) ("Expenditures which are not deductible be-
cause personal are not made any less personal or transformed into business expenditures
through the mechanics of capitalizing them as cost of an engineering degree so as to supply
a basis for claiming a deduction therefor as depreciation"); Huene v. United States, 247
F.Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)(expenses incurred by taxpayer in attending law school were
not ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on business as an accountant so as
to be deductible under § 162 of the 1954 Code); Joel A. Sharon, 66 T.C. 515, aff'd sub nom.,
Sharon v. C.I.R., 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978) (costs of amortizing college, law school, and
bar review course held to be non-deductible personal expenses under § 262 of the 1954
Code).
17 Amortization of education expenses in theory could occur under either I.R.C. § 195
(capitalization of start-up expenditures) or 263 (capital expenditures). See generally John
W. Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans,
Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of Basics, 6 Va.Tax Rev. 1 (1986).
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earned from this investment in human capital. In a purely norma-
tive system only a portion of education costs are amortized, how-
ever, because education is not entirely an investment in human
capital but contains elements of pure personal consumption or cul-
tural enrichment as well.
2. Education: An Investment in Human Capital. The deduct-
ibility of education loan interest expenses under normative income
tax theory depends upon the characterization of at least a portion
of education as an investment in human capital.58 Professor Ste-
phan defines human capital:
Human capital, in economic terms, is equivalent to the pre-
sent value of the flow of future satisfactions that an individual
can command in the course of his life. Some portion of this
capital constitutes endowment, the biological and social inher-
itance that accompanies a person into the world. The remain-
der is acquired through individual action, such as education,
on-the-job training, migration, and health care, or stems from
exogenous changes such as technological or social
transformation."
Under Professor Stephan's definition of human capital, individuals
may "acquire" or increase human capital through education. Edu-
cation has two potential results: (1) it can increase a taxpayer's
personal cultural enrichment, raising the level of future non-taxa-
ble satisfactions, and (2) it can increase a taxpayer's earning capac-
ity. These results form the foundation for normative tax treatment
of education expenses under the Haig-Simons definition of income.
The first result, as a general principle, represents a consump-
tion item which does not produce a greater level of taxable income
and, on normative grounds, does not merit a deduction. In many
respects, the return on such an investment in education is purely
personal, enriching the investor culturally but not producing a tax-
able benefit.
11 For analysis of the problems inherent in defining human capital see Stephan, 70
Va.L.Rev. at 1364 (cited in note 51). See also Alan Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46
U.Chi.L.Rev. 370, 382 (1979)(taxing an individual's earning potential may place "an unac-
ceptable restriction on freedom"). On the human capital concept in general, see Gary S.
Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to
Education (2d ed. 1975); Elchanan Cohn, The Economics of Education 13-20 (1979).
" Stephan, 70 Va.L.Rev. at 1358-1359 (cited in note 51)(footnote omitted). See also
Theodore Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 Am.Econ.Rev. 1 (1961)("Much of what
we call consumption constitutes investment in human capital. Direct expenditures on educa-
tion, health, and internal migration to take advantage of better job opportunities are clear
examples.").
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It would be inaccurate to conclude, however, that the invest-
ment is entirely personal in nature. Individual investment in edu-
cation also produces rewards to society. Education increases the
intelligence of the citizenry, which improves the democratic pro-
cess.60 In addition, society benefits from those individuals whose
education induces them to pursue public interest work after their
schooling. Since public sector jobs generally pay less in economic
terms than comparable private sector jobs, the individual generally
receives a lesser economic return. The educated individual may be
compensated for the lower economic return by a greater sense of
cultural satisfaction. The nation obtains an increased benefit from
this labor, therefore, at a cost below similar work purchased in the
private arena. Clearly, an individual may benefit personally from
time spent in public service if she later enters the private sector;
nevertheless, society benefits from the individual's earlier invest-
ment in education in the form of high quality public service at re-
duced cost.
More important for our analysis, however, is the second of the
two results: an investment in education generally leads to greater
taxable income. Like any capital investment, individual investment
in education produces an economic return of present value in ex-
cess of the present value cost of the investment.6 1 For the average
individual, an investment in education produces a return, in the
form of a future income stream greater than it would have been
without such an investment. The total cost of the education com-
prises (1) the forgone earnings62 the student bypassed to pursue an
education, (2) tuition, (3) books and supplies, and (4) the cost of
financing any borrowing to pay for such education. This aggre-
00 Cohn, Economics of Education at 32-33 (cited in note 58).
11 See Education Statistics at 286-88 (cited in note 39).
62 For many students, forgone earnings may be inconsequential. No matter how small
such earnings are, however, they must enter into the calculation, especially for those weigh-
ing the costs of pursuing an education against current earnings. Under purely normative
theory, foregone earnings (or imputed income) require taxation. For example, a college stu-
dent would be taxed on the imputed income she receives while attending school. See Ste-
phan, 71 Va.L.Rev. at 1368 (cited in note 51). However, the practical difficulties with taxing
imputed income render such taxation unlikely.
'3 Under I.R.C. § 163(h), homeowning taxpayers can deduct the interest expense of bor-
rowing against their home to pay any education expenses. This option also extends to inter-
est on similar loans used to finance any personal consumption items, such as automobiles or
living expenses. Superficially, these items, when used by a student, may appear to be a
"cost" of seeking an education; however, they are more accurately characterized as con-
sumption items and would not be deductible on normative grounds. Furthermore, other
Code sections contradict § 163(h)'s generous treatment of consumption items. Section
127(c)(1) specifically excludes meals, lodging, and transportation from the definition of em-
19881
The University of Chicago Law Review
gate figure must then be apportioned into its component parts, re-
flecting cultural enrichment and investment in human capital. The
analysis focuses on the extent to which the return on such an in-
vestment is a non-taxable return in the form of pure cultural en-
richment or is taxable income in the form of enhanced earnings.
For the majority of taxpayers, the actual result is a mixture of the
two, with enhancement of the taxpayer's earning capacity tending
to be directly proportional to the educational level attained.6 4
Education costs should be deductible even if one assumes that
education serves only to identify those taxpayers with greater ge-
netic and social endowments. If one views education as an identi-
fier which adds nothing of value to the taxpayer, one might con-
clude that education is purely an exercise in consumption. This
view assumes that those taxpayers who pursue education would
earn equal or greater amounts without an education. While the ap-
plicability of this argument at first appears limited to those fields
which, unlike law and medicine, are not regulated monopolies re-
quiring higher education for admittance, one can argue that tax-
payers entering these regulated fields would earn equal or greater
amounts if they entered other fields which do not require higher
education. This general line of reasoning fails, however, because
the identifying function of education alone leads to enhanced earn-
ings capacity. Even if the process of education (classes, exams,
studying) is not directly related to earnings, it nonetheless in-
creases the earnings value of the taxpayer's human capital because
it identifies those taxpayers with greater genetic or social endow-
ments. Thus, the investment in an "identifying" education is a cost
of enhancing earnings capacity and requires amortization. It is of
no consequence that education may be of little or no objective
value, as long as it serves an identification purpose which results in
a higher earnings potential. Because education expenses are a cost
of producing increased income, the investment portion of educa-
tion costs are properly amortized and deducted according to nor-
mative theory.
3. Reasons to Use Human Capital Theory. The argument for
allowing deductions for education expenses relies upon the accept-
ployers' non-taxable "educational assistance." See also § 117(b)(2), which provides that the
deduction for "qualified tuition and related expenses" includes only tuition, fees, books,
supplies, and equipment required for courses of instruction.
" See Education Statistics at 286-88 (cited in note 39). See also Survey Finds Outlook
on Jobs is Good for College Graduates, N.Y.Times at 11, col. 5 (Dec. 1, 1987)(citing Michi-
gan State University study).
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ance of the human capital theory. Critics of human capital theory
cite the moral difficulty society might have in valuing taxpayers'
useful lives and depreciating human assets. 5 Opposition to apply-
ing human capital theory stems from the perception that treating
human capital like tangible capital, such as machines and build-
ings, dehumanizes people. Any moral squeamishness ought to
yield, however, to the positive consequences of allowing taxpayers
depreciation deductions for education expenses. 6 A deduction
gives taxpayers greater resources to invest in their human capital
and, by reducing tax bias against investment, makes such options
as attractive as investment in non-human capital. Some of the
money otherwise used to pay taxes is freed for more productive use
by the taxpayer. These factors combine to facilitate individual ac-
cumulation of human capital through the pursuit of higher educa-
tion, ultimately resulting in greater individual freedom.
Moreover, Congress implicitly subscribes to the view that edu-
cation is an investment in human capital: Congress grants corpora-
tions a deduction for employee education expenses under § 162
and grants employees a deduction for education related to the
maintenance of their present jobs under Treasury Regulation
1.162-5. These provisions rely on the premise that specific educa-
tion expenses equal business expenses for certain taxpayers. While
these deductions thus are viewed as an extension of the corporate
deduction, these rules implicitly acknowledge the validity of apply-
ing human capital theory to education expenses. The human capi-
tal concept also underlies the depreciation deductions taken under
§ 167(a) by professional sports teams for amortization of the value
inherent in their players' contracts.67 These examples demonstrate
Congress' willingness to follow human capital theory in other areas
of income taxation. In the context of education loan interest ex-
penses, fairness demands applying human capital theory to all
" See Stephan, 70 Va.L.Rev. at 1364-1366 (cited in note 51) (summarizing the many
arguments against taxing human capital).
" In examining taxation of human capital, Professor Stephan refutes arguments
against such a proposal advanced by Professors Kelman and Warren. Stephan, 70 Va.L.Rev.
at 1365-1366 nn.12 and 14 (cited in note 51). Stephan first claims that our present tax sys-
tem already taxes human earning potential indirectly. Second, he says that taxing human
earning potential does not violate "personhood" any more than does our system of damages
under contract law. Finally, he argues that any images of slavery that the human capital
concept may invoke are clearly alarmist and inaccurate. Through individual action and in-
vestment in human capital, taxpayers expand their personal economic freedom, not enslave
themselves. See also Schultz, 51 Am.Econ.Rev. at 2 (cited in note 59); Lester Thurow, In-
vestment in Human Capital 124 (1970).
"' See Selig, 740 F.2d 572.
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taxpayers."
III. A PRACTICAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR MODIFICATION OF §
163(H)
This section will argue that the expense of borrowing for edu-
cation should be deductible against ordinary income when the in-
terest expense is paid, in order to ameliorate the burden imposed
by denying the deductibility of most education expenses. This pro-
posal represents a compromise solution to the difficult practical
problems raised by a purely theoretical approach. Subsection A de-
scribes in more detail the proposed legislative solution; subsection
B then justifies the proposal.
A. Legislative Solution
The following proposal follows a more normative course than §
163(h). It relies upon the conclusions reached in section II and
makes a deduction for education loan interest equally available to
all itemizing taxpayers. Under this proposal, the taxpayer calcu-
lates her loan interest deduction in the following manner. First, the
taxpayer computes the total interest due over the repayment pe-
riod on her loans. This ordinarily will be done during the first tax-
able year after she has completed her education.6 9 The lender eas-
ily can notify the taxpayer of the total interest due and of the
length of the repayment period. Second, the taxpayer amortizes
the total interest due over the repayment period to arrive at the
proper amount of deductible interest for each taxable year, an-
" The human capital concept, though readily accepted in the economic and academic
communities, has received little attention by Congress, the courts, and the IRS in interpret-
ing our tax laws. Stephan, 70 Va.L.Rev. at 1357 (cited in note 51). Nevertheless, some courts
use it in the marital property area. See, e.g., Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich.App. 693, 264 N.W.2d
97 (1978) (amount of alimony awarded wife represented her contribution toward husband's
medical degree); In re Cropp, 5 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) 2957 (Minn.Dist.Ct. 1979) (award of
gross alimony would be justified on theory of wife's property interest in educated spouse's
future earnings). See generally Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Ed-
ucation: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 Kan.L.Rev. 379
(1980); Note, Equitable Interest in Enhanced Earning Capacity: The Treatment of a Profes-
sional Degree at Dissolution, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 431 (1985). But See In re Marriage of Graham,
194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (holding that an M.B.A. degree acquired during marriage
is not property subject to distribution upon divorce).
Note also that race horses are commonly amortized and depreciation deductions are
taken over their worklife. See F.C. McDougal, 62 T.C. 720 (1974).
"' The educational institution must fulfill the requirements of I.R.C. § 170 (governing
organizations to which deductible contributions may be made) and the regulations pre-
scribed thereunder. The Treasury publishes a list of all educational organizations which sat-
isfy this provision.
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other calculation which the lender can provide. In essence, this
method forces the taxpayer onto the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method of accounting; the amount of each deduction exactly
matches the interest paid in each taxable year. The deduction is
taken against ordinary income of the taxpayer, as such income is
the return on the taxpayer's investment in education.
Early repayment of the education loan would result in acceler-
ated deductions of the interest. Refinanced amounts would follow a
similar route to deductibility. Carryforward provisions could be
implemented to protect those taxpayers who are unable to fully
utilize deductions. Furthermore, taxpayers who borrow for both
college and professional school can preserve interest deductions for
future taxable years when the return on their education invest-
ment actually accrues.
B. Interest Expenses and Normative Theory
The proposed deduction for interest expenses offers an accu-
rate, simple, and administrable treatment of education expenses.
The solution compensates for the practical difficulties that bar the
deductibility of the bulk of education investment expenses by al-
lowing a deduction for both the investment and consumption por-
tions of the interest expense. The inclusion of the consumption
portion of the education interest expense in the amount deducted
is not an error but a useful remedy for other departures from nor-
mative theory which also enhances administrative simplicity for
both the taxpayer and the government. This proposal more closely
follows a normative course than does the denial of interest deduct-
ibility to the majority of taxpayers currently found in § 163(h).
This section's proposal for deducting education loan interest
thus is a compromise that ameliorates the denial of the education
expense deduction while avoiding the administrative difficulties in-
herent in efforts to separate education expenses into consumption
and capital portions. Although pure normative theory permits the
deduction only of the capital portion of this cost, allowing the de-
ductibility of the entire interest expense is justified on two
grounds. First, proper normative deductibility of the bulk of edu-
cation costs is highly unlikely to occur. Second, allowing a deduc-
tion for both the consumption and investment portions of the in-
terest expense avoids useless complexity and cost.
1. Impracticality of Normative Amortization for the Bulk of
Education Expenses. Both administrative and economic impedi-
ments bar the deductibility of the bulk of education expenses. On
the administrative level, normative treatment of all education ex-
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penses is unlikely because of the difficulty in computing the proper
depreciation deductions. One cannot accurately predict the length
of each taxpayer's working life or the amortization period. Even if
one satisfactorily could approximate the taxpayer's work life, it is
impossible to quantify either the fraction of human capital invest-
ment or cultural enrichment that together comprise all education
expenses. Therefore, amortization rates are impossible to calculate
with precision on an individual basis.
One could overcome the difficulty of predicting the length of
an individual taxpayer's life by defining the amortization period as
the average working life of all taxpayers at a given level of educa-
tional attainment." However, using statistics on the average length
of working life would be somewhat unfair to those taxpayers who
stopped working before the average period and an undue benefit to
other taxpayers who worked beyond the average. Additionally,
most taxpayers earn more in the years closest to retirement, so one
could argue that a greater portion of the educational investment
should be attributed to those years rather than to earlier years.
Thus, it is unclear that the straight-line method of amortization
provides a reasonable compromise. 1
Even if one could approximate the amortization period, it is
impossible to break down education costs on either an individual
or aggregate level. For example, some students rarely attend class
and do minimal amounts of work, spending the bulk of their time
consuming available leisure time, while other students may work
tirelessly to increase their human capital. A student's intensity or
dedication, however, may have little to do with economic motive or
with the level of economic return achieved. Moreover, it may seem
unfair to allow a deduction to a student attending an expensive
private institution who only goes to school for cultural enrichment
or consumption and then works in a job that does not call upon
70 One can find the exact period for each taxpayer in a comprehensive Labor Depart-
ment study. The average length of working life is between thirty-five and forty years for
most male college graduates, and between twenty-five and thirty years for most female col-
lege graduates. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Worklifs Estimates: Ef-
fects of Race and Education, Bulletin 2254 14, 20 (1986). The study gives worklife expectan-
cies for men and women by years of schooling completed, age, and whether currently active
or inactive in the labor force.
"' But see Walter J. Blum, Accelerated Depreciation: A Proper Allowance for Measur-
ing Net Income?!!, 78 Mich.L.Rev. 1172 (1980)(attacking the view that accelerated deprecia-
tion upholds tax neutrality in the context of machinery and buildings). Professor Blum's
reasoning could be extrapolated to the human capital context and might support a straight-
line method here. Indeed, portions of the Code use straight-line depreciation. See I.R.C. §
168 (accelerated cost recovery system); § 57(b) (straight-line depreciation of intangibles).
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anything she might have learned in school. It is impossible to de-
termine on an individual basis what portion of that individual's
success is attributable to an investment in education and what por-
tion derives from unrelated factors.
Moreover, economic and political pressures provide an inde-
pendent reason for believing that the Code will not allow amortiza-
tion of the bulk of educational expenses along proper normative
lines. Throughout the tax field, numerous items beg for normative
treatment but will never receive it because of the prohibitive cost
to the Treasury of allowing their deductibility. The deductibility of
educational costs is among these items. Approximately $21 billion
is spent on higher education tuition and fees by students." If even
one-fifth of this were deductible by taxpayers in the 28 percent tax
bracket as an investment in human capital, it potentially could re-
duce government revenues by well over $1 billion annually." Total
federal support for education currently exceeds $63 billion annu-
ally. 7 4 Moreover, society currently feels that individuals and fami-
lies who can afford to save for education should pay for their edu-
cations without government subsidization. 5 This view, coupled
with the prohibitive cost to the Treasury of allowing such a broad
deduction, renders it unlikely that Congress will implement one,
even if justified on normative grounds.
2. Normative Treatment of the Cost of Borrowing for Educa-
tion. This comment proposes that the entire interest expense of
education borrowing be deductible because it will diminish the
negative effects of denying a deduction for all education expenses,
will enhance conformity of the tax code to normative principles,
and is not prohibitively costly. Since some percentage of education
is an investment in human capital and the cost of this investment
generally far exceeds the interest expense of borrowing for educa-
tion, the full amount of interest expenses should be deductible as
they are paid.
As is true of all loans, an education loan is not treated as taxa-
72 Education Statistics at 228 (cited in note 39).
7' The calculation is: ($21,000,000,000)(1/5)(28%) = $1,176,000,000.
7' Education Statistics at 280 (cited in note 39). The $63 billion includes both direct
and indirect government expenditures for all levels of education.
75 Recently, proposals encouraging taxpayers to save for education have proliferated at
both the federal and state levels. These plans usually take the form of "college bonds,"
"educational savings bonds," or "tuition futures." The former two proposals involve the sale
of government bonds to taxpayers with interest accruing tax-free-paralleling the current
treatment of tax-free municipal bonds. See Allan Murry and Joel Davidson, White House
Backs Tax-Free Bonds for Education, Wall St.J. at 44, col. 2 (Jan. 5, 1988).
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ble income of the student when borrowed. 76 Under conservative
normative analysis, however, the investment portion of the educa-
tion expenses financed by the loan should be amortized over the
future work life of the student. Theoretically, the amount of amor-
tized interest will mirror the proportion of underlying principal
that is attributed to an investment in human capital.7 7 Although
such calculations are impossible to make accurately on an individ-
ualized basis, one can overcome this inaccuracy and reach a norma-
tively justifiable result.
Treatment of education as a capital investment raises two fa-
miliar questions: (1) What fraction of the interest expense should
be attributed to investment and increased earnings capacity?, and
(2) Over how many years should the interest expense of borrowing
for education be amortized? The former question is easily an-
swered since the bulk of education expenses probably will never
receive proper normative deductibility. The non-deductibility of
the entire principal more than offsets the consumption portion of
the interest expense. 78 Therefore, the entire interest cost is prop-
erly deductible.
Determining the number of years over which to amortize the
interest is more difficult. The interest cost of an education is most
accurately matched with a taxpayer's early earning years. Initially,
an employee is hired for her education and her potential contribu-
tion to her employer's economic success. Thus, earnings in the
years immediately following graduation account for much of the
present value of the education investment. As the taxpayer ages,
the economic value of education obtained many years earlier, while
still important, diminishes, and any increased earnings tend to re-
flect experience and job skills acquired while working as well as
education.
11 See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 48 (4th ed. 1985). Parents bor-
rowing to finance their child's education are similarly treated. It is a settled tax principle
that loans are not income because of the duty to repay those loans. As a corollary, loan
payments are not deductible.
" For a discussion of capitalization of interest expenses, see Surrey, Pathways to Tax
Reform at 261-64 (cited in note 9).
11 Professor Klein proposes that investment and consumption are interchangeable since
assets can be sold to finance consumption or consumption can be constrained to finance
investment. The ability to borrow allows avoidance of this principle. See generally, William
A. Klein, Borrowing to Finance Tax-Favored Investments, 1962 Wisc.L.Rev. 608. Applying
this argument to education results in the position that students should forego consumption
to avoid borrowing to finance education. This theory disintegrates when applied to educa-
tion, however, because students borrow amounts far in excess of their consumption levels.
Investment and consumption are not fungible for most students. This theory may have
greater applicability to the family unit of taxation rather than the individual unit.
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It is clear, therefore, that straight-line depreciation of the cost
of an investment in education over a taxpayer's working life is un-
satisfactory, especially since the work histories of individual tax-
payers are highly unpredictable. A more desirable depreciation
schedule amortizes the interest expense over the repayment period
specified by the terms of the loan itself. This results in a satisfac-
tory matching of the borrowing cost of the investment in education
with its return in the years immediately following graduation since,
on average, education loans are repaid over ten years.79 Even if one
borrows the full cost of education so as to maximize the interest
expense and to produce the largest deduction possible, the repay-
ment plan will automatically spread the deduction over ten years.
Alternatively, if a student borrows a lesser amount, the interest
cost will be lower and spread over a shorter time period. In each of
these cases, the built-in repayment plan provides an accurate
matching of the cost of the loan with the return on the education
investment. When the interest cost is smaller, the return attributa-
ble to that cost also is less, so the repayment and the smaller de-
ductions occur over fewer years.
In addition, a taxpayer's ability to repay the loan is a natural
constraint on deductions. If the taxpayer receives sufficient return
on her investment, enabling her to shorten the repayment period,
the interest cost is reduced and the taxpayer receives a smaller in-
terest expense deduction. If the taxpayer receives a lower than ex-
pected return from her investment and earnings have not been en-
hanced, she will either default on the loan or repay the loan with
unearned income from another source. There will be no interest to
deduct if the taxpayer defaults on the loan and no earned income
from which to deduct interest if she must rely on unearned income
to repay it.
If the taxpayer invests in education and receives little or no
return in the form of enhanced earnings capacity and she can pay
the interest charges with earnings from a job that is unrelated to
her education, should the taxpayer still receive a deduction for the
interest paid? Yes, because the taxpayer risked investing in educa-
tion. Even though the investment failed to pay off, the taxpayer
still deserves a deduction. A positive return is not a prerequisite to
" The ten year average repayment period is typical of a federally guaranteed student
loan. Department of Education, Statistical Analysis Department (telephone conversation
with Department Analyst). The Department of Education divides this period into 2.5 years
in college, a 6 month grace period, and a 7 year repayment period. The Department of
Education relies on these figures for internal budget calculations.
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deductibility and, in any event, policing a taxpayer's intention in
pursuing education is impossible. One can assume that most tax-
payers do not bear the costs of education merely to avoid taxes.
In summary, deducting interest expenses when paid results in
a satisfactory matching of return on the investment in education
with the cost of producing that return and should be allowed since
the income is taxed as it is produced. Making education loan inter-
est deductible when paid also facilitates administration of the de-
duction;80 such a deduction would add only a minimal level of com-
plexity to returns. Some scholars have argued that a universal
interest deduction should be available; if one accepts their argu-
ment then the case for this limited deduction for education loan
interest becomes all the more powerful."' Such a limited deduction
is tax neutral since most taxpayers will not borrow for education
merely to receive the tax benefit. Finally, this treatment avoids un-
desirable costs associated with implementing, applying, and en-
forcing a complex proportional deduction system that attempts to
separate consumption from capital investment.
A criticism of allowing the deduction of education interest ex-
penses and education expenses in general is that such a deduction
would place an additional burden on taxpayers who do not have to
borrow for education or those taxpayers who do not invest in edu-
cation. Even if this criticism is valid, it is underinclusive because
many deductions are only available to those who pursue particular
investments. Moreover, it does not undercut the proposition that
interest expenses should be deductible as a cost of producing in-
come. Education costs are plainly among the individual invest-
ments which merit deduction of interest expenses as they are paid.
80 Section 163(a) of the 1954 Code (now repealed) testifies to the administrability of
such an interest deduction.
8' See Alan Gunn, Is an Interest Deduction for Personal Debt a Tax Expenditure?, 1
Can.Tax. 46 (1979). But see Calvin H. Johnson, Is an Interest Deduction Inevitable?, 6
Va.Tax Rev. 123 (1986). In reaching a contrary result Professor Johnson outlines the various
theories underlying the concept of the universal interest deduction. Briefly, they are (1) that
individuals with and without capital should be taxed equally; (2) that lenders and borrowers
form an inherent investment partnership and the taxation of the lender on the interest
received requires matching deductibility for the borrower; (3) that all cash is fungible and
matching is impossible so it is useless to attempt rationalizing the deductibility of some
interest and the non-deductibility of other interest; and (4) that the deductibility of interest
provides a valuable reference point for taxation. Id. at 124-25.
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C. The Proposed Legislative Solution Avoids the Inequities of §
163(h)
As discussed in sections I and II, § 163(h) deviates from the
normative theory assumed by this comment's legislative solution.
The crucial distinction between the proposed solution and § 163(h)
is the tax neutrality of the former that is noticeably absent in the
latter. First, if all taxpayers, however they structure their educa-
tional borrowing, receive the proposed deduction, they will be more
likely to make educational investment decisions uninfluenced by
federal tax considerations. Second, the proposed solution promotes
fairness because all taxpayers can deduct education loan interest,
whereas § 163(h) unfairly discriminates between homeowners and
non-homeowners. Third, the proposed solution results in greater
simplicity for both taxpayers and the government since it requires
taxpayers to deduct their education loan interest payments as they
are made, in contrast to § 163(h), which may compel taxpayers to
enter complex transactions in order to deduct educational interest
expenses. Fourth, the proposed solution does not require that the
taxpayer secure borrowing for education with a residence, as does §
163(h). Fifth, the proposed solution more closely approximates a
normative model to taxation because it allows a deduction only for
education loan interest expenses, while § 163(h) gives a general de-
duction to homeowners for personal interest expenses.
CONCLUSION
This comment has proposed that interest on loans for educa-
tional purposes should be deductible equally by all taxpayers who
borrow to invest in their human capital by pursuing education.
Congress should not preserve a politically expedient tax policy
which sacrifices investments in human capital-one of our most
valuable resources-in its search for revenues. The normative the-
ory of taxation requires that the interest expense of borrowing for
education be deductible. This deduction should not be linked with
homeownership, but rather to individual investment in human
capital.
If § 163(h) is not amended the nation may suffer both econom-
ically and culturally. Fewer individuals from non-homeowning
families, primarily those of disadvantaged economic groups, will
realize their full potential because they will decide that the cost of
borrowing to invest in education is not justified by the return on
such an investment. These individuals will pursue a course which
is rational on an individual basis but costly for the nation as a
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whole.8 2 Our tax laws ought to encourage, not discourage, the pur-
suit of education and individual investment in human capital.
82 Because an equally available interest deduction creates a more highly educated popu-
lace, over time, it will stimulate greater growth and productivity thus increasing the GNP
and the nation's tax base, resulting in a future net gain to the government. See generally
The Blue Book at 6 (cited in note 7) ("The sharp reductions in individual and corporate tax
rates provided by the Act and the elimination of many tax preferences will directly remove
or lessen tax considerations in labor, investment, and consumption decisions").
